Roger Burlingame was the first American historian who tried to deal with these big questions against the broad expanse of American history, and in the essentials, at least, most historians of technology have followed his lead. The picture of technology as a motive force in American civilization which Burlingame sketched in two books written in the late thirties'-that of technology as the major force leading to our unity as a nation-is a dramatic one which assigns to technology a central-one might even say a determining-role in American history.
The key methodological concept in the Burlingame analysis is that of the "social lag," a concept formalized by the sociologist Ogburn in 19232 and generally adopted by historians of technology ever since. Technology, so the notion goes, changes society by changing our environment, to which we, in turn, adapt. Between the change and the adaptation, however, there is always a lapse of time, the social lag. Technology, in this view, is the primary active force; sooner or later other institutions come into conformity with it. The social history of technology, then, is the story of institutions trying to catch up with technological realities. Thus the failure of politics to catch up with technology was a cause of the Civil WVar; the individualism of the 1870s was another example of social lag; the persistence of privately owned utilities is still another.
There is probably something to the concept of a social lag, at some times and in some places, but I would like to suggest that uncritical adoption of it is one of the great difficulties besetting us in the history of American technology. For the question of whether, on the whole, technology causes social change or social change causes technological change is one of the "big," and still unresolved, questions before us. Treating it as a fully resolved matter has been a cause of much confusion and, I think, misdirected effort, and it has obscured the nature of some of the other big questions.
I do not wish to be understood as arguing that technology does not have social consequences-of course it makes a difference in the life styles of every human being in a society whether production is by machine or by hand. In American history, it is perfectly true that the drift to the cities which accompanied growing industrialization altered the whole social hierarchy and political control of the nation. Nor would I be inclined to argue that the atomic bomb did not have important implications. What I do believe is that no single technological innovation-and no group of them taken together in isolation from nontechnological elements-ever changed the direction in which a society was going before the innovation. Even when the innovation is imposed from without, anthropologists have demonstrated that societies display a remarkable ability to adapt it to their own life styles. Urbanization in American history, for example, was a phenomenon in which technology was involvedbut the process itself was a broad social movement, beginning before the technological innovations that are often cited as its determinants; and its explanation involves immigration, population growth, finance, and other matters as well as technology. And I further believe that the direction in which the society is going determines the nature of its technological innovations. Of course, these are at present unproved assumptions, although I think that recent studies lend them a certain amount of credence.
At any rate, the biggest question of all has to do with the nature and direction of causation, and at present we know very little about it. There is a pressing need for studies that will shed light on this question; the only advice I have is that we realize that it is a question. Despite the lack of evidence, most scholars who have concerned themselves with the relations between technology and society have implicitly adopted the point of view of Ogburn and of Burlingame by framing their research questions in such terms as: What was the effect of the automobile, the railroad, the typewriter, or the radio, on society? They have then observed the uses of such single innovations and assumed that the innovation was the direct cause of the uses. This was the "impact" of the innovation. In this, both those who deplore technology and those who believe that it can solve all of man's problems agree. Thus Ogburn and Nimkoff studied certain changes that have taken place in the American family and attributed them all to recent technology, with no consideration of trends antedating the technology. In the same manner, Ogburn counted well over a hundred "impacts" of the airplane.3
General American historians, on those rare occasions when they deal with technology at all, also adopt this framework. If he knows anything about technology, the general American historian is likely to have at least two facts available which he places somewhere in his book to demonstrate his virtuosity: (1) The cotton gin fastened slavery on the South and thereby was a major cause of the Civil War, and (2) the typewriter brought women to work in offices and thereby "liberated" them. An unscientific survey, which consisted of going to the library and looking through a shelfful of high school and college texts, indicated that almost all of them contained these two "facts." Gilfillan, in commenting upon the second of these claims, made the obvious point that in Japan there were women office workers, neither liberated nor getting much help from the typewriter.4 More to the point than Gilfillan's objection is the fact that American women had been in the process of being "liberated" for a full generation before the appearance of a typewriter. Women had already been working in American offices, and they were beginning to do so in increasing numbers. Women had, in fact, been working previously at a great variety of jobs in America; their moving into offices, I suspect, can be directly correlated with the increase in the total number of workers at this kind of job. One may as well credit the invention of the tin can, the contraceptive, or any of a hundred other things with the emancipation of women, a purely social process which took advantage of appropriate inventions when they appeared and perhaps, in fact, stimulated the appearance of those inventions. The fact that the typewriter in America brought more women into the offices is not altogether irrelevant. It fit neatly into a preexisting social process and facilitated that process, as did the tin can and the contraceptive. Would the contraceptive have been accepted in a society that firmly believed the lot of women was to be forever bearing children? Contemporary experience suggests that it would not. What would have happened had the typewriter been invented in a society where the very idea of women in offices was unthinkable? This is probably an unanswerable question, although there is a related one that could be answered; namely, what happens when typewriters are introduced into societies where they have not been used before and where women do not hold jobs outside the home? Do they bring women into offices? I doubt it, but the answer would help us to understand the role of our own technology better.
The same case could be made about the other familiar example. It is perfectly true that technology contributed to the profitability of slave labor, as it did to free labor, not simply in the form of the cotton gin, but with spinning machinery, power looms, and other equipment which left only the production of raw materials relatively unmechanized. But slavery was already fastened on the South, and it was on the rise before the introduction of the gin because of the opening of new lands. The allegation that slavery would have disappeared and there would have been no Civil War without the cotton gin is therefore pure romanticism. The problem in the 1790s was that of using all the cotton that could be produced with the available labor supply; thus, invention was aimed at remedying the balance. It was a case of the same technological disequilibrium that Rosenberg found to be such a potent stimulus for innovation in the late 19th-century machine-tool industry.5 A high productive capacity at one level of the process stimulated invention at another. Far more significant than what the gin did to slavery is the fact that the gin was invented in a society where the labor system was based on slavery. I remain relatively certain that had there been no Eli Whitney and no cotton gin, Southerners would have found other uses for their slaves. I also remain convinced that had there been no slaves, but there had still been a flying shuttle, invention would have been aimed primarily at the production stage of cotton manufacture.
In both these cases and in many others that could be mentioned, the real effect of technical innovation was to help Americans do better what they had already shown a marked inclination to do. This, I suggest, and not a lack of talent or imagination on the part of historians, is the reason that after so many efforts have been made, we are still unable to point to any broad social consequences of an innovation. Historians who deal in such matters, it seems to me, have simply been asking unanswerable questions. The use of an invention does modify the user's habits, but there is no evidence that it has markedly changed the direction of the total complex of habits. Habits seem to grow out of other habits far more directly than they do out of gadgets. * * * Recent trends in economic history, I think, may offer us a more realistic and more satisfying framework than that of the social lag-provided we make sufficient allowances for economists' biases. For a very long time, economists and economic historians tried resolutely to ignore technology. They looked upon it as an alien force which occasionally disturbed the equilibrium of the economy they were studying. "Assuming that the state of the arts remains constant" was a frequently encountered phrase in their work, and this simplifying assumption helped them to understand other elements of the economy. When they did discover technology, their characteristic response was to try to deny its equilibrium-disturbing character. The economist concerned with the question of economic growth generally draws smooth curves showing a steady rise in productivity. His curves can contain the introduction of the telegraph, the telephone, the railroad, the automobile, or the airplane and yet show no trace of a revolution. It is possible, of course, that the sheer weight and complexity of the economic structure, especially one so weighty and complex as that of the United States, can disguise revolutionary changes. The shifting of resources and effort as some industries become obsolescent, the local effects of changing patterns, the ruining, for example, of thousands of small businessmen with the rise of the mail-order house-such things will not be revealed by gross figures such as the GNP. When dealing with economic historians, we must be on guard against this possibility. But I do believe that their smooth curves, even with their limitations, give us a more realistic picture of the historical process than the historian of technology with his dramatic revolutions and his discontinuous leaps.
Economic historians have taken their penchant for continuity quite far-too far, at times, one might argue. Thus Fogel used statistics, logic, and argument to demonstrate that the railroad innovation had no particular economic consequences.6 Others have shown that even great bursts of technological activity, such as those promoted by wartime conditions, can be contained in the smooth curves that existed independent of the bursts. The Civil War has recently suffered such a downgrading as a causal factor.7 Schmookler came close to transposing the inventor-that eccentric, unpredictable, lonely individual of legend-into an economic man, rationally calculating relative advantage, assessing the market and inventing or not inventing, changing directions from railroads to electric shop motors in response to the same economic forces that the pawnbroker, the industrialist, or the merchant obeyed. Schmookler's key point was that invention was essentially an economic activity, and from this relatively simple concept a great deal followed.8
Although I would not like to exchange one hackneyed stereotype for another, there is a great deal to be said for Schmookler's picture of the inventor, and in studies carried out over the ten years before his recent death, he gathered a great deal of evidence to support it. He concluded that new goods and new techniques are unlikely to appear unless there is a preexisting demand in the society. In other words, more significant than a "social lag lander's study is, of course, subject to the same criticism made earlier of Marshallian economics, but even though his framework may have concealed the importance of major technical change, there can be no doubt that he has demonstrated that minor increments were more important thar we generally recognize.
Such a finding is of obvious importance for an understanding of the role of technology, and, if borne out by other studies, it will have broad implications. For one thing, it may help us finally to overcome the penchant for substituting biographies of inventors for careful analysis of social processes. Of more use to the historian would be knowledge of shop practices, activities of lower-level technicians in factories, and so forth-and all of these are still relatively unexplored. For another thing, it may help us to understand such otherwise perplexing conclusions as those of a Brookings Institute study18 which found that there was no standard pattern in the relationship between highway investment (technological progress) and economic development. Sometimes such investment proved profitable to the country, sometimes neutral, and sometimes ruinous. The exact impact seemed to depend upon such things as existing economic patterns, character of the resources, and, of all things, the attitudes and entrepreneurial capabilities of the people. There is, so it is beginning to appear, no simple connection between the diffusion of technology and economic growth. That there is some kind of connection seems obvious to us, but what its nature is and how it operates appears even more mysterious than ever. In fact, the more one studies, said two students of world history in 1966, the more one wonders whether the countries that industrialized became rich because they industrialized or industrialized because they were rich.19 Kuznets, of course, had made the same point much earlier.
Such a question has obvious implications for our current drive to westernize the world, but this is not the place to go into them. More to the present point is the fact that it immediately raises questions about our own industrialization process. What were the forces which within less than two generations-between 1800 and 1850-raised a technologically backward nation to such a level that it could begin to export to the "advanced" European nations a manufacturing technique and machine tools so different that the whole performance of his scholarly reputation to that relatively simple explanation.23 Since men could not be found who could do the work, there resulted an intensive search for machines that could. Whenever they were found, they were widely adopted. Peter Temin, reacting to Habakkuk's work, insisted that both the high wages paid to labor in the United States and the widespread market possibilities were statistical illusions-the first because writers had confused money wages with real wages (which some recent students have found to be no higher than in England), and the second because they had confused the geographical with the economic extent of the market. Temin, finding that the most important and pervasive of differences between English and U.S. technology was the use of less capital per worker, concluded that the high interest rate, rather than a fictional "labor scarcity," was the primary factor in shaping American
technology.24
The difficulty in accounting for the rise of the American system has been compounded by the fact that no one is yet quite sure what is being explained. Thanks to the meticulous work of Woodbury,25 no one except writers of American history textbooks believes any longer that a complete system of interchangeable-parts manufacture sprang full-blown from the mind of Eli Whitney. But there is still some doubt as to the nature and extent of use of the major principles of the system-quantity production, interchangeable parts, specialized machinery. Uselding, as a result of an exhaustive study of the records and equipment of the major arms makers, now doubts that any American arms manufacturer had a system of interchangeable parts in the 1840s. He has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the method of rolling gun barrel scalps, patented in England in 1811, was not brought to America until 1856, when it was observed at the Enfield armory after Enfield had begun using American machines. When one realizes that approximately 15 percent of the labor expended in producing a musket was absorbed in making the barrel, he is led to reflect that the American system was perhaps not so highly developed by the mid-century as has been assumed.26
Outside of gun making-to whatever degree it was actually usedand clock making, the fully developed American system was for the most part confined to woodworking. The United States, in general, was backward in the production and fabrication of iron. Seizing on this point, two economic historians have recently noted that the woodworking machines popular in America and neglected in England were not only labor saving but also wasteful of wood. The adoption in America and neglect in England might, they thought, be attributable primarily to the cheapness of wood in the United States and its high price in England, not to differences in the capital-labor ratio. To back up their point, they adduced abundant evidence to the effect that American practices were relatively well known in England long before the New York Exposition, traditional date for the "discovery" by Europe of American technology, but were deliberately rejected as unsuitable for English conditions.27 This discovery, in itself, certainly suggests that our traditional explanations are questionable.
While skilled workers and techniques during the first few decades after the Revolution. Finding out is especially difficult in the case of the United States because the historian gets no real clue from "foreign names." At any rate, it was much greater than anyone ever dreamed before case studies began to be made. Much of this importation, we know, was at the encouragement of Americans, acting as quasiofficial representatives of the government in direct violation of British law. This was, in fact, no less than de facto American political policy. The pace was so rapid that one student concluded that the smuggling of machinery and the seduction of mechanics was turned into a "fine art" immediately after the Revolution.33 We have long known of the importance of Samuel Slater, whose success has turned him into a legend; we are only now beginning to realize that he was only one among many. The process continued for a very long time, and it brought skills essential to our developing technology-tinsmiths from Wales in the late 19th century, chemical technology from Germany after the First World War, German rocket experts after the Second World War. In general, the contributions of the later technologists are better known than those of the earlier ones-yet it is clear that the earlier group was of great importance in shaping our technology. How many there were, when they came and why, and what skills they brought to American technology, are big questions for some future historian.
Another fact that cannot be dismissed is that throughout the early 19th century Americans do seem to have been far more interested in British discoveries than the British were in American developments, resulting in a definite asymmetry in the flow of information which became a positive advantage for Americans. Perhaps this was due to that "higher degree of education" which is often alleged of American workmen, perhaps only to the feeling of inferiority which Americans, beneath the surface of their blustery nationalism during that period, continued to feel toward Europeans; or perhaps the fault lies simply in a peculiar British reluctance to learn from former colonials. At any rate, it is a fact that Americans, much to their advantage, eagerly assimilated British improvements while the British ignored American improvements of which they had full knowledge.34 This is an important point which has been too often ignored. What is now needed is an effort to determine the full extent of the borrowing, to assess its importance, and to study characteristic changes (if any) that Americans made in the equipment and techniques they borrowed from Europe. The evidence that is now in, although it remains fragmentary, suggests that characteristic American changes in imported technology increased its marketability by either making it cheaper or adapting it for broader uses. Native inventions generally had these same features. The metallic woodworking plane, described by Welsh, is a good example of such an invention.36 The "consumer orientation" of American technologists and inventors may turn out to be one of the important distinguishing features. One gets the idea that when Americans invented, they tended to concentrate on devices with immediate widespread sales possibilities. As the milling machine and the grinding machine indicate, both of which had widespread terms of breaking down a job into human actions-as we know, the great obstacle that 19th-century inventors had to overcome. The machine sequence is usually not similar to the sequence of human actions in performing a job. The Blanchard lathe, for example, which is really a sequence of sixteen different machines, first used in processing gunstocks, was a characteristic American invention. The essential point about the Blanchard lathe is that while each replaced standard carpenters' tools and also the labor of skilled carpenters, the sequence of operations performed by Blanchard lathes does not correspond to the sequence of manual operations, and one cannot associate particular lathes with particular carpenters or tools. Only someone thoroughly familiar with the job of making a gunstock, as opposed to cutting a blank, filing, or fitting a gunstock, could have conceived of the Blanchard lathe. And this, during that period, implies an American mechanician. Too early division of labor may be a positive disadvantage. Had historians taken Drucker up on his suggestion that the organization of work be used as a unifying concept in the history of technology, I might be able to report many other interesting comparisons.39 Thus far, however, his suggestion seems to have fallen on deaf ears. * * * As mass production seems to be the chief distinguishing feature of our technology, it is only natural that so much effort has been devoted to its origin. But what of its effects? Considerable effort has been devoted to these as well. A frequently encountered allegation is that mass production produced standardization and this standardization has led to a standardization of thought and opinion. This point was emphasized by Burlingame, who at times took a rather dim view of the technology which he had invested with such active force. Once again there is an element of truth in the allegation, but it is not directly traceable to machinery. Indeed, the fact that American conditions and American thought were amenable to standardization may have had a great deal to do with the success of mass production. Long before the machine age-long before the first glimmerings of interchangeable parts and mass production-even if one be as charitable as possible and trace it to the time of Whitney, standardized people had been an article of American faith. In the pre-Revolutionary period, Crevecoeur had made quite a point of the fact that there were no extremes in America; it was a land of "middling competence." Simplicity
